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Abstract:  
This essay explores the vitality of an Althusserian reading of Capital by means of a 
reconsideration of the so-called “theoreticism”. In this sense, I propose to approach 
the Althusserian intervention in the terms of a proper materialist query about 
practices. Following the idea posed by Etienne Balibar about the philosophical worth 
of Marxist theory in XXI century, I develop the thesis that in the light of Marxist 
“philosophy”, the misunderstood relation still existing between theoretical and 
political practices are nevertheless thinkable. Finally, I propose that in as much as it 
might be considered that in this relation lies the kernel of Marx’s discovery, it also 
could be a basis for rereading Capital under present challenges. 
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No future without Marx 
 
The question of how to address Marxist theory today in itself implies a 
rejection of simplified answers. For different reasons, Marxism can be considered – at 
the same time – extremely actual and almost dead, and while its conceptualization of 
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Capital’s mechanisms is unavoidable, the topic of “the crisis of Marxism” appears to 
be the current starting point for any productive approach to Marxism today.   
This contradiction is captured by Etienne Balibar when he suggests that “there is no 
Marxist philosophy, and there never will be; on the other hand, Marx is more 
important for philosophy than ever before”. 1 
 In a quite general way, one can also understand this thesis from the sense of 
Derrida’s position:  
 
It will be more and more a fault, a failing of theoretical, philosophical, 
political responsibility, when the dogma machine and the "Marxist" 
ideological apparatuses (…) are in the process of disappearing. We no 
longer have any excuse, only alibis, for turning away from this responsibility. 
There will be no future without this. Not without Marx. No future without 
Marx.2 
 
In a tense dialogue with Derrida’s claim, I recall Balibar’s contention that Marx 
will still be read in twenty-first century “not only as a monument of the past but as a 
contemporary author”.3 Besides sharing this aim with Derrida, Balibar’s development 
wouldn’t entirely subscribe to Derrida’s thesis that “there must be more than one 
Marx” stated to produce his own call for a new reading it in the twilight of the 
twentieth century. Balibar doesn’t subscribe to it because, in the trail of Lenin, his 
reading implies a choice, a side-taking in a kampfplatz, which certainly includes 
some criterion of the true, at least, a practical or non-explicit one. Still, they both 
concur in the idea that it is the future, the very possibility of willing a future, which lies 
to be rediscovered in these spectral or “contemporary” writings.  Further it becomes 
apparent that, as in the darkest moments of the 20th century, it is within heterodox 
philosophical thinking (such as Benjamin’s, Adorno’s, Lukacs’s, Gramsci’s, 
Althusser’s) where its critical potencies will develop.  
This essay intends to follow the apparent contradiction between the dead and 
the future in the search for the actual Marx. In this sense, Louis Althusser would be 
the philosophical name of the kind of anachronism from which I aim to circumscribe: 
the one of the so-called theoreticism. In this sense, I will pose the thesis that the effort 
of giving rise to the very political power of Marxist theory today requires rigorous 
work on the precise status of theory itself. Far from speculative pleasure, this 
statement follows a strict urgency of current conjuncture: the menace of a joint-
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venture between technocratic ideology and the worse-kind of political spontaneism, 
the sort of right-wing leftism currently embodied in desperate or paranoid masses.   
In this context governed by technocratical thinking a paradoxical non-
philosophical practice of philosophy would eminate as the most actual anachronism 
of Marx. As the most enigmatic, delicate and powerful phrase of The Eighteenth 
Brumaire suggests, there is an unwritten theory of time within the pulse of Marx’s 
theory:   
 
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot take its poetry from 
the past but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has 
stripped away all superstition about the past. The former revolutions required 
recollections of past world history in order to smother their own content. The 
revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead in 
order to arrive at its own content. There the phrase went beyond the content 
– here the content goes beyond the phrase.4 
 
The enigma of the dislocation (decalage) between the phrase and the content 
opens the field of a theory of time that is both, a practical defense of philosophy and 
a political call to assume the task that has to be done. Or, moreover, a defense of 
philosophy in its right to existence; a philosophy that can only be posed by means of 
a rigorous consideration of its inherent political core. 
 
Che vuoi Reading Capital? 
 
Much debate has emerged since Althusser’s philosophical intervention. As 
Warren Montag has claimed, “more had been written against him than about him (…) 
to denounce him as a Stalinist, as structuralist, or both, most of his critics, despite 
their often incompatible theoretical and political positions, unwittingly collaborate to 
produce an overwhelmingly negative judgment of his work”5. 
In this sense, the most significant concurrence is that one of J. Rancière and E. P. 
Thompson, who together bring an extremely dedicated struggle with Althusser, albeit 
for opposite motives, despite returning to similar conclusions: the conception of 
theoreticism as a mostly conservative thought. While the latter considers the critique 
to historicism as a pure disregard of any political praxis, the former concedes that the 
most “theoreticist” thesis of Althusser paradoxically encourage many young students 
to take part in political struggle. This is even though Rancière still accuses Althusser 
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for furnishing a kind of solution “from above” to the revisionist crisis which in turn 
misconceives the power of the masses.6  
 It is not my purpose to discuss these accusations, but rather to notice that 
 each of them embody those specularly-opposite ideological tendencies 
Althusser was fighting against inside the field of Marxism: these being, historicism as 
the blurring of the difference between theory of history as well as the history of theory 
(and, consequently, the subordination of the real scientific practices to idealist 
philosophy’s normative regulation); and politicism as the dilution of the difference 
between theoretical thought and political thought (and, consequently, the 
subordination of politics to an idealist, epistemological conception of practice). 
Against the imaginary immediacy of an abstract, general and pure praxis, Althusser’s 
position resists avant la lettre as reductions of the over-determinated complex of 
concrete practices.  
 It might be difficult to understand, but it should be underlined that it was on the 
purpose of conceiving the proper conception of concrete differences of the most 
heterogeneous social practices, that Althusser was driven to pose the problem of 
theory itself. In this regard, I suggest that the critical revision of idealist Epistemology 
– to which Althusser was dedicated during the early sixties- was the prerequisite to 
consider concrete practices both in their different historical articulation as well as in 
the singular forms of their concrete existence. I propose, therefore, that the so-called 
“theoreticist” approach to Marx’s Capital was oriented by this aim and more so it is 
this complex connection between politics and theory which happens to be 
overlooked  today when the worth of Marxist theory is debated.7 
 To explore Capital in order to find a genuine materialist approach is to 
demand that theory assume its own practical condition. Further, to pose the practical 
entity of theory is to problematize (recursively) the procedure of reading itself:  
 
I merely proposed a 'symptomatic ' reading of the works of Marx and of 
Marxism, one with another, i.e., the progressive and systematic production 
of a reflection of the problematic on its objects such as to make them 
visible, and the disinterment, the production of the deepest-lying 
problematic which will allow us to see what could otherwise only have 
existed allusively or practically. As a function of this demand, I can claim to 
have read the specific theoretical form of the Marxist dialectic in its directly 
political existence (and actively political: the policies of a revolutionary 
leader – Lenin – immersed in the revolution). But this reading was not, nor 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Anachronism of the True. Reading Reading Capital 
 
 
457 
 
could have been, a direct reading or the merely 'generalizing ' reading (…) 
this reading was in principle a dual reading, the result of a different, 
'symptomatic' reading, which introduced into a question an answer given to 
its absent question.8 
 
Reading Capital is an appeal to produce the practical exercise of 
simultaneously posing two questions: the question of the object of Capital, and the 
question of the specificity of the relation of theory with its object: “the question of the 
nature of the type of discourse set to work to handle this object, the question of 
scientific discourse.”9 
It is the question of theoretical discourse (a recursive interrogation about 
theoretical status) placed in the immanent space of both existence and concrete 
theory. Althusser discovers this meta-question in a “practical state” in Marx’s works: 
the immanency of a practical criterion of the true. The question about the specific 
status of theory, interrogated in its practical condition – in other words, practice taken 
as the nature of theory itself and not as any kind of “corruption”, “expression”, 
“application”, “second instance”, etc. – needs to be developed into two completely 
separate problematics, despite these problematics existing together: the “epistemic” 
problem of the strictly scientific status of some determinate practices  – thus, the 
validation criteria “purely internal to the practice”10  – and the problem of the material 
(historical) existence of scientific practices in a wider (non-theoretical) conjuncture.  
It must be underlined that there is a slight but substantial difference between 
the sort of critique Althusser discovers in Marx and a mere post-foundationalist 
critique to metaphysics, which is somehow implied in this distinction. The difference 
lies in the exigency of deriving from the critique a new positive theory of knowledge 
production, which of course involves the question of how to discern a criterion of the 
true. There is no Marxist theory (neither as scientific discourse nor as political 
thought) if this requirement is abandoned to epistemological (or cultural) relativism.  
 This supposes an intellectual effort of stating theoretical specificity regarding 
other discursive formations and regarding other (non-theoretical) practices. Finally, 
this claims for a complex conception of practice, irreducible to a simple or general 
relationship to real, being that the notion of an immediate-corporeal contact with 
things or an immediate cognition of the truth (either in empiricist or idealist versions).  
It was by means of this dual reading of Capital that Althusser was capable to 
identify the complex bond that connect these two incommensurable (while quite 
imbricated) dimensions of a theoretical combination (Verbindung). It was by means 
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of this practice of reading – which included the interrogation about reading 
procedures – that he was able to reach the singular dialectic that conjoins and 
tenses history and theory (as a double problem of the conjuncture and as a result of 
historical process, both acting as structural mechanisms). 
 
When we pose the question of the mechanism by which the object of 
knowledge produces the cognitive appropriation of the real object, we are 
posing a quite different question from that of the conditions of the 
production of knowledge. This latter question is derived from a theory of the 
history of theoretical practice, which, as we have seen, is only possible 
given the application of the concepts which enable us to think the structure 
of that practice and the history of its transformations. The question we are 
posing is a new one, one which is precisely passed over in silence in the 
other. The theory of the history of knowledge or theory of the history of 
theoretical practice enables us to understand how human knowledges are 
produced in the history of the succession of different modes of production, 
first in the form of ideology, then in the form of science.11 
 
There, where superficial and precipitated readings have seen a dichotomy 
between “structure” and “genesis” as a subsequent choice for pure formalist 
standpoint, Althusser gives rise to a completely different question: the question of the 
singular (materialist) philosophical practice, capable of making room for two 
problems at the same time (now re-named as the problem of a conjuncture as a 
“result” and the problem of a conjuncture as a “mechanism”).   
This is the question of dialectical materialism. Not dialectical materialism as a 
philosophical system, but dialectical materialism in action – that is, working “in a 
practical state” – in Marx’s writings. 
  
Overdetermination: practice and time 
 
To pose the difference between Marxist and Hegelian dialectics, Althusser tried to 
name it with the Freudian notion of overdetermination. He followed the idea that the 
materialist conception of necessity may be developed in terms of the deep 
connection that binds a non-contemporary concept of temporality with the complex 
structure of the social whole:   
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…the structure of the social whole must be strictly interrogated in order to 
find in it the secret of the conception of history in which the 'development' 
of this social whole is thought (…) with the object of constructing the Marxist 
concept of historical time on the basis of the Marxist conception of the 
social totality”12.   
 
Whereas, in the idealist conception of social totality as a spiritual whole, real 
practices have no incidence but that one already presupposed by an essential 
philosophical principle.13  
The question of efficacy is the question of philosophy, in as much as it is the 
question of the “laws of history”. It must be considered therefore, that Marxist 
intervention is located in an already occupied field: by the Cartesian mechanistic 
system or the Leibnizian concept of expression.  In as much as scientific discovery of 
the theory of history developed in Capital as a critical work contained 'in the practical 
state' (what is to say, without producing the concept of it in a philosophical opus) a 
“simple question” so new and unforeseen that “it contained enough to smash all the 
classical theories of causality”:  
 
The mechanistic system, Cartesian in origin, which reduced causality to a 
transitive and analytical effectivity: it could not be made to think the 
effectivity of a whole on its elements, except at the cost of extra-ordinary 
distortions (…). But a second system was available, one conceived precisely 
in order to deal with the effectivity of a whole on its elements: the Leibnizian 
concept of expression. This is the model that dominates all Hegel's thought. 
But it presupposes in principle that the whole in question be reducible to an 
inner essence, of which the elements of the whole are then no more than 
the phenomenal forms of expression, the inner principle of the essence 
being present at each point in the whole...14  
 
Both systems had been rejected by Marx in his Thesis on Feuerbach but it had 
been especially from the rupture implied in Thesis VI, which rejects at the same time 
essential principle and phenomena attributes, that a new materialist causality can be 
shaped as a movement of a double struggle against idealism and empiricism.15 
Althusser went this far to reach the necessary space to pose a problem that has 
been all the time so near. The proper statement of the primacy of practice over 
theory can only emerge from a proper critique of the ideological (idealist) notion of 
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practice, in so far that it hides an unseen primacy of ideas (philosophy) over 
(historical determined) practices. In this sense, a dual reading is a critical reading of 
that double movement and in which the foreclosure of the practical condition (and 
historical commitment) of theory accords with an ideological image of practice 
(finally constrained to humanism).  
This critical procedure is implied in what Althusser, following Bachelard – in 
the peculiar way that Balibar has pointed out16 and has called, rupture.17 The 
Althusserian conception of rupture should be understood against the empiricist 
conception of time expressed in the image of an “essential section”18: “the possibility 
of reading in the immediacy of a present (or of an instant) the whole system of 
determinations of a historical phenomenon”. This take us to a singular (almost 
paradoxical) conception of an “event” that is a process or a “break as the beginning 
of a process that has no end”19, where any reduction of the couple science/ideology 
to the philosophical dichotomy of truth and error, has no place.   
In this sense, it should be underlined that the conception of a plural temporality 
is the core of materialism. And, if it is pursued as a concept of time, it is because it 
already worked in the very practical process in which Marxist materialism thought 
had taken place. A heterogeneous and contradictory process which conjoins 
theoretical and political practices lies within that of such political men as Lenin, who 
“meets Imperialism in his political practice in the modality of a current existence in a 
concrete present” and that of the theoretician of history or the historian, who “meet it 
in another modality, the modality of non-currency and abstraction”20.  
The aim here is to achieve a kind of thought capable of putting together what 
already resists to be in touch with political practice and theoretical practices and 
conceived in their differential articulation while also making a claim for a deep 
consideration of the concept of time. For it is in relation with temporality that one of 
the main aspects of their difference can be captured. Here theoretical practice reads 
fait accompli while political practice focuses “on the present in the present, on the 
necessity to be achieved, on the means to produce it, on the strategic application 
points for these means; in short, on his own action”.21 
Therefore, the opportunity for formulating in a theoretical form the singularity of 
this materialism lies in the “space” opened by the duplicity of reading that pursues “a 
variable relationship between two inseparable terms: the unity of practice and 
theory”22. Once the epistemological dichotomy is discarded, one can start to consider 
the difference between theory and politics within the framework of a new kind of 
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philosophical practice, one of a paradoxical conjunctural theory, or a revolutionary 
science: 
 
This is what is irreplaceable in Lenin's texts: the analysis of the structure of a 
conjuncture, the displacements and condensations of its contradictions 
and their paradoxical unity, all of which are the very existence of that 
'current situation' which political action was to transform, in the strongest 
sense of the word, between February and October, 1917.23 
 
Theory sive practice 
 
In his preface to Reading Capital Althusser wonders:  
 
Need I add that once we have broken with the religious complicity between 
Logos and Being; between the Great Book that was, in its very being, the 
World, and the discourse of the knowledge of the world; between the 
essence of things and its reading; -once we have broken those tacit pacts 
in which the men of a still fragile age secured themselves with magical 
alliances against the precariousness of history and the trembling of their 
own daring— need I add that, once we have broken these ties, a new 
conception of discourse at last becomes possible?24 
 
Why could one say that the question of dialectics, as I have developed thus far, 
is compelled within the gesture of posing the discursive status of theory? In 
Philosophy for Non-Philosophers, published just recently in English, Althusser 
develops an answer that might be understood in this sense: as a double-front battle 
against idealism of general practice, and empiricism of pure theory (which involves 
the illusion of transparency in language).  This supposes two movements: 1) the 
critique of every image of practice as an imaginary immediate relationship to the 
real, which Althusser recognizes as an element of the genealogy of the Myth of Eden; 
and 2) the effort of giving rise to a materialist conception of practice.  
 In the chapter, titled “The Myth of State of Nature”, Althusser inscribes 
empiricism within the legacy of religious discourse, while suggesting that the 
epistemological adequatio rei et intellectus, is deeply committed to an ideological 
notion of practice as an immediate relationship to real, indebted to the “religious 
myth of reading”25: 
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Not only was it enough to stretch out one’s hand to pick fruit that was 
always ripe in order to satisfy one’s hunger and thirst; it was also enough for 
Adam to see something with his eyes or take it in his hand in order to know 
it completely. Contrary to what is all too often supposed, human beings had 
the right to know all things: this knowledge was provided by the senses, 
was identical to the understanding in man, was identical to the words 
designating it, and was perfectly immediate and transparent. Adam did not 
have to work, produce or seek in order to know.26 
 
Althusser is dealing with the idealist notion of practice as an immediate 
relationship to the real in order to show that the most corporeal images, those of 
mechanic materialism, empiricism of direct pure action, are constitutive elements of 
the inner world profiled by idealist discourse structure insofar as that notion of 
practice is the specular inverted partner of pure theory. In Greek, theory means “to 
contemplate”, which alludes to the opposition between manual handling and vision, 
supposing that “one does not handle what one sees”: “the hand [main], which  
‘handles’ [manie] or ‘manipulates’[manipule], which works, is contrasted to the eye, 
which sees at a distance, (…) commonly called consciousness…”27.  
It is in the persistence of this dichotomy where the separation of pure theory as 
vision, pure practice as manual labor, and idealist epistemology and different kinds 
of idealism of practices (from empiricism to phenomenology) work together. What all 
emphases lack is the inherent complexity of real human relations to the world and 
where neither theory, nor practice are isolated from one another.  In as much as this 
difference, materialism is understood in terms of a simple inversion of primacy of 
pure theory over pure practice which it is still captured by the whole idealist 
problematic. It is at this point where the core of Marxist materialism is interrogated to 
develop a new concept of practice, capable of avoiding binary schemes.  
In order to deal with this question, Althusser introduces a dialectical 
problematization of the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis by means 
of the triadic approach that is involved in the concept of social practice of production.  
Etienne Balibar has pointed out clearly the depth of Marx’s philosophical revolution in 
this singular rupture of the Aristotelian distribution of practices into the types of 
poiesis and praxis and where the former alludes to determined actions in the sort of 
natural (mechanical) necessity, the latter names the inner subjective transformation 
of a subject.  Regarding the concept of production Balibar states that:  
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Marx removed one of philosophy’s most ancient taboos: the radical 
disctintion between praxis and poiesis (…) not a mere inversion of the 
hierarchy –a ‘theoretical workerism’ if I can put it thus (…)- but the 
identification of the two, the revolutionary thesis that praxis constantly 
passes over into poiesis and vice versa. There is never any effective 
freedom which is not also a material transformation, which is not registered 
historically in exteriority. But nor is there any work which is not a 
transformation of the self (…) such a thesis cannot but affect the third term 
of the classical triptych: theôria…28  
 
Here, where positivist interpretations of Thesis XI might find an invitation to 
abandon philosophy, it can be discovered instead, a revolutionary turn in the 
question of materialism, which gives shape to an interrogation about the type of 
apodicity which is capable of conceiving the distance between historical objectivity 
and the true. In this sense, the problem of conceptualizing the specificity of different 
practices is a matter of furnishing the problem of an immanent and complex 
causality. It is there where dialectical materialism, insofar as it confronts at the same 
time the images of Cartesian mechanistic system and Leibnizian expressive causality 
might open the path to a rigorous theory of history, while at the same time, 
revolutionizing the philosophical field. 
The challenge of defining a non-immediate conception of practice coincides 
with the interrogation of the Marxist whole in terms of a conception of an 
overdeterminated condition of human practices.29 With the notion of social 
production, the whole triptych (praxis-poiesis-theôria) is disrupted. It is at this point 
where the concept of production arises in its philosophical depth, which is to say, 
surpassing the mere sociological scope.  
As a practice, production is irreducible to the image of an immediate 
relationship to the real because it is irreducible to a simple dyadic relation (hand and 
nature). It is firstly, impossible to state production as a pure practice not mediated by 
cognition, ideas, abstractions of all sorts (be that “consciousness” or technical 
knowledge, physical theories inscribed in tools, cultural ideas involved in different 
kinds of works, etc.) and, secondly, it is impossible to consider it without stressing the 
social character of the relationship that overdetermines the dialectical bond between 
praxis and poiesis.  
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If, as Balibar has pointed out, Marx removed the distinction between praxis and 
poiesis, it is because of the radically new category of practice which takes shape in 
his philosophical intervention is part of a new ontological thought. It might be 
considered transindividual ontology, in as much as practices can only be considered 
“individual” in as much as they are social. As he pointed out, in relation to the VI 
Theses on Feuerbach:   
 
It is significant that Marx (who spoke French almost as fluently as he did 
German) should have resorted to the foreign word ‘enssemble’ here, clearly 
in order to avoid using the German ‘das ganze’, the whole or totality. 
Perhaps things would be clearer formally (…) if we, in our turn, added a 
word to the text (…) to characterize the constitutive relation which displaces 
the question of the human essence, while, at the same time, providing a 
formal answer to it (…) The word does in fact exist but is to be found in 
twentieth-century thinkers (Kojeve, Simondon, Lacan…) we have in fact to 
think humanity as transindividual reality…30 
 
Every practice is a social practice, and as such, brings into play a set of 
elements so complex, that we are led to conceive them “not as acts or simple 
activities, but as processes: that is, as a set of (…) elements sufficiently well adapted 
to each other for their reciprocal action to produce a result that modifies the initial 
givens31. Overdetermination is, in this sense, a kind of causality that can be figured as 
a structure of structures; where the material transformation of nature cannot be 
considered but, rather, determined by social relations as complex processes where 
both objectivity and subjectivity take shape.  
 
I have previously attempted to account for this phenomenon with the 
concept of overdetermination, which I borrowed from psycho-analysis; as 
one might suppose, this transfer of an analytical concept to Marxist theory 
was not an arbitrary borrowing but a necessary one, for the same 
theoretical problem is at stake in both cases: with what concept are we to 
think the determination of either an element or a structure by a structure? 
(…) The constant and real presence of this problem in Marx has been 
demonstrated by the rigorous analysis of his expressions and forms of 
reasoning in the preceding papers. It can be entirely summed up in the 
concept of 'Darstellun ', the key epistemological concept of the whole 
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Marxist theory of value, the concept whose object is precisely to designate 
the mode of presence of the structure in its effects, and therefore to 
designate structural causality itself.32 
 
Since The German Ideology, the category of division of labour introduces to the 
core of materialism a notion of practice that won’t be any more redirected onto any 
simplified image, the relation that people have to their means of subsistence is 
governed by the relation of production, and is thus a social relation “a three- term 
abstraction”, underlines Althusser. Insofar practice of production includes this basic 
relation as its condition, “the relations governing the other practices can be put into 
relation with this first relation”33.  
 
And since this social relation is, in class societies, a conflictual, antagonistic 
relation, determination by production (the base) is not mechanical, but 
includes a ‘play’ that comes under the dialectic. That is why this 
determination is said to be ‘in the last instance’ (…) To underscore this 
determination ‘in the last instance’, Marx presented his general hypothesis 
on the nature of social formations and history in the form of a topography.34 
 
If production can be considered in this sense a term with a double function –in 
as much as it determines the belonging of all terms of the structure, while itself being 
excluded from it by the operation of posing a “lieutenant”, as many authors had 
posed, it is quite far from the formalist tendencies of former structuralism. For the 
main problem of Marxist theory (which, as I have stated, implies the problem of 
apodicity itself) is also the problem of elaborating the concept of time. A proper 
approach to the question of production must furnish the problem of “invisible times”, 
a concept of time as the principle on which the very possibility and necessity of a 
plurality of different histories, corresponding to different levels of a very complex 
topography is based. This means necessarily accepting “the relative independence 
of each of these histories in the specific dependence which articulates each of the 
different levels of the social whole with the others.”35    
 
I should say that we cannot restrict ourselves to reflecting the existence of 
visible and measurable times (…) we must, of absolute necessity, pose the 
question of the mode of existence of invisible times, of the invisible rhythms 
and punctuations concealed beneath the surface of each visible time. Merely 
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reading Capital shows that Marx was highly sensitive to this requirement. It 
shows, for example, that the time of economic production is a specific time 
(…), but also that, as a specific time, it is a complex and non-linear time -a 
time of times, a complex time that cannot be read in the continuity of the 
time of life or clocks, but has to be constructed out of the peculiar structures 
of production.36 
 
It is at this point where the singularity of Althusserian reading of Capital resides, 
usually occluded by precipitated interpretations that directly assume its belonging to 
Levi-Straussian structuralism or to barely non-Marxian post-structuralism: in the 
pursuing of a materialism of overdetermination it is capable of conceiving the social 
whole as a hierarchical and unequal structured process which is unified in its 
diversification by the type of articulation, displacement and torsion which harmonizes 
different times with one another. In other words, a transindividual combination of 
practical processes is a time of times: 
 
…We have known, since Freud, that the time of the unconscious cannot be 
confused with the time of biography. On the contrary, the concept of the 
time of the unconscious must be constructed in order to obtain an 
understanding of certain biographical traits. In exactly the same way, it is 
essential to construct the concepts of the different historical times which 
are never given in the ideological obviousness of the continuity of time 
(which need only be suitably divided into a good periodization to obtain the 
time of history), but must be constructed out of the differential nature and 
differential articulation of their objects in the structure of the whole.37 
 
The topography of overdetermination is not “an ontology of binarism” nor is it the 
mere problem of formal structures, not even the problem of structures as processes 
of variation. Rather, it a question of structures as complex conjunctures. This thesis 
poses itself within the void of political practice in the very epistemological space of 
the materialist apodicity. 
 
Political practice/theoretical practice 
 
The question of materialism is, from here on, also a question of pursuing a very 
peculiar kind of necessity, a necessity capable of inhabiting at the same time the 
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most heterogeneous practices.  As Althusser himself, pointed out, we shall start by 
considering practices in which the Marxist dialectic as such is in action: Marxist 
theoretical practice and Marxist political practice. It must be stressed that the sort of 
necessity capable of making room for political practice should be seriously 
considered with the paradoxical formula of a “rule of exception”38: 
 
If it is true, as Leninist practice and reflection prove, that the revolutionary 
situation in Russia was precisely a result of the intense overdetermination of 
the basic class contradiction, we should perhaps ask what is exceptional 
about this ' exceptional situation ', and whether, like all exceptions, this one 
does not clarify its rule - is not, unbeknown to the rule, the rule itself.39 
 
An accurate reading of this passage could note that the peculiar way in which 
Althusser understands the conjunction of theoretical and political practices and 
where dialectical materialism inhabits in action, is neither a kind of proper 
application of theory to politics, nor a complementation of the former by the latter. It 
is the whole rejection of any subsumption of the notions of politics and theory into 
the epistemological idealist schemes of pure Practice and pure Theory, the abstract 
and the concrete, the Subject and the Object. 
 
I said that Marx left us no Dialectics. This is not quite accurate. He did leave 
us one first-rate methodological text, unfortunately without finishing it: the 
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859. This text does not 
mention the ' inversion ' by name, but it does discuss its reality: the 
validating conditions for the scientific use of the concepts of Political 
Economy. A reflection on this use is enough to draw from it the basic 
elements of a Dialectics, since this use is nothing more nor less than the 
Dialectics in a practical state. I said that Lenin left us no Dialectics (…) This is 
not quite accurate. In his Notebooks Lenin did leave us some passages 
which are the sketch for a Dialectics. Mao Tse-tung developed these notes 
in the midst of a political struggle against dogmatic deviations inside the 
Chinese party in 1937, in an important text On Contradiction.40  
 
The aporetic trail that takes form in Althusser’s writings on dialectical materialism, 
in the 60’s, must be followed carefully to achieve the complex conjunction that 
makes Marxist theory not only a theory of history (or, of the class struggle), but also a 
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singular formula of theoretical thought itself, the one that plunges into crises the 
whole epistemological tradition.  
 
A (re)commencement instead of a conclusion 
 
If Reading Capital can be read as an exhortation, it should be the exhortation to 
develop the theoretical consequences of the most fruitful axiom of materialism: the 
primacy of practice. One can find it a delicious paradox that the most accurate effort 
in giving rise to a theory based on this axiom has been named theoreticism. A 
footnote of Reading Capital reveals this suggestive thesis: 
 
For very profound reasons, it was often in fact political militants and leaders 
who, without being professional philosophers, were best able to read and 
understand Capital as philosophers (…) we can study Marxist philosophy at 
work in them, in the 'practical' state, Marxist philosophy which has become 
politics, political action, analysis and decision.41  
 
It is not just by chance, but for very “profound reasons” that is by means of a 
political practice that dialectical materialism can be read in its philosophical depth. 
The question of dialectical materialism is within the scope of political leaders and is a 
question of the conjunctural nature of structures. It is also where the claim of a 
proper concept of time takes place.   
It is because of political practice, as I have already mentioned that is a practice 
that works on the limits of the present, that it can practically pursue the singular 
materialist thought that figures the unrepresentable conjoint between theory, that 
“necessarily reflects on necessity's fait accompli”, and political practice as the 
practice “of a revolutionary leader who reflects on the present in the present, on the 
necessity to be achieved, on the means to produce it, on the strategic application 
points for these means ; in short, on his own action”.42 
It is neither mere illustration, nor accurate interpretation of Marx’s dialectical 
materialism which Althusser had searched for in Lenin’s or Mao’s thought, but rather 
the movement of a practical detour that indicates that political practice is far from 
being a complement to theory as it introduces a constitutive void – a void that is an 
activity of opening an inner distance – in the decentered core of theoretical 
discourse’s structure.  
  This is an inner distance that could only be reached by a big detour: 
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One has to leave one’s own world behind and make the Big Detour of the 
world to know one’s own world. One can never venture too far a field in 
quest of the adventure of coming home. The same holds for philosophy.43 
 
This subtle paradox may indicate the worthiness of a renewed reading of 
Capital as a kind of symptomatic reading introduced by Althusser. It happens that in 
searching for the concept of time implied in Marxist dialectical materialism, 
Althusser`s anachronic theoreticism can expose one of today’s most weakest flanks 
of critical theory facing neoliberal ideology’s force: the lack of a political will of the 
true.  
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